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APPELLANT BRIEF 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This appeal is from the decision of the Hqnorable Judge Ben H. Hadfield denying 
Appellant's Motion to Suppress, 
Jurisdiction to hear the above-entitled appeal is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 78-2a-3(2)(c) (1953 as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
POINT II The Trial Court erred in not allowing Appellants' to use the video tape of the 
preliminary hearing to cross-examine the Officers at the suppression hearing. 
Standard of Review 
[W]e review legal determinations for correctness. 
852 P.2d 977, Hansen v. Heath, (Utah 1993) 
Excerpt from page 852 P.2d 979 
POINT I The Officers did not have probable cause to enter Appellants' residence. 
Standard of Review 
[W]e review legal determinations for correctness. 
852 P.2d 977. Hansen v. Heath, (Utah 1993) 
Excerpt from page 852 P.2d 979 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
U. S. CONSTITUTION AMEND. XIV Section 1: All persons born or naturalized in the 
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the 
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
UTAH CONSTITUTION ART. I Section 7: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE WITH CITATION TO THE RECORD 
Appellants Damon and Misty Comer were charged with Possession of a Controlled 
Substance, a second degree felony on or about July 18, 2000, R 1 
A Motion to Suppress was filed by Appellants on December 12, 2001 by appointed 
counsel Justin C. Bond. R. 49. A response to the Motion to Suppress was filed by the State of 
Utah on December 20, 2001. R. 53. A hearing was held on January 16, 2001 on the Motion to 
Suppress. After hearing testimony and arguments, the Court denied Appellants' Motion to 
Dismiss. R. 83. 
Appellant Misty Comer entered a guilty plea to Possession of a Controlled Substance, a 
second degree felony. Appellant preserved her right to appeal the suppression issue pursuant to 
plea negotiations with the State of Utah. R. 106. Appellant Misty Comer was sentenced on 
March 27,2001. 
Appellant Damon Comer entered into plea in abeyance agreement with the State of Utah. 
Pursuant to negotiations, Appellant Damon Comer preserved his right to appeal the suppression 
issue. R. 103. In the minutes of the sentencing hearing on March 27, 2001, the Court 
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specifically stated Appellant Damon Comer reserves his right to appeal on the search issue. R. 
103. Further, in the Judgment and Order on Plea Held in Abeyance, Appellant Damon Comer 
preserved his right to appeal the search issue. 
A notice of appeal was filed on March 28, 2001. 
On January 16, 2001 a hearing was held on the motion to suppress filed by Appellants. 
Officer Dickey testified for the State of Utah. On July 5, 2001 Officer Dickey responded 
to Appellants' residence on report of a family fight in progress. Officer Gerfen and Detective 
Vincent also arrived on the scene. Officer Dickey knocked on the front door of the residence. 
Appellant Misty Comer answered the door wearing only a light sleeping shirt. Officer Dickey 
stated Appellant opened the door less than one foot. Officer Dickey stated why he was there and 
asked Appellant Misty Comer if there was anyone else in the residence. Appellant Comer stated 
her husband was there and immediately turned and walked back into the residence. 
Officer Dickey then stated he followed Appellant Misty Comer into the residence. 
Appellant Comer put her head inside of the doorway of the back bedroom and told Appellant 
Damon Comer the police were there. Appellant Comer exited the bedroom and closed the door 
behind him, R. 125 P 4-6. 
Officer Dickey stated there was no evidence of a fight in the residence. R. 125 P 6. 
Officer Dickey testified it appeared to him that when Appellant Misty Comer opened the 
door she was either concealing something or trying to prevent the officers from seeing inside. R. 
125 P 7. 
Officer Dickey testified he briefly scanned the room when he entered the residence. 
Counsel requested to show the video tape of the preliminary hearing as it evidenced Officer 
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Dickey's testimony was inconsistent with earlier testimony. R. 125 P 9. 
Officer Dickey was asked when he first questioned Appellant Misty Comer if there was 
any evidence she might be armed. Officer Dickey stated he did not recall. R. 125 P 11. 
Officer Dickey stated when Appellant answered the door, there was no sign she had been 
through a straggle. R 125. 19. 
Officer Dickey stated that at the time Ms. Comer answered the door, he did not know one 
way or the other whether there was an emergency that he needed to react to inside the house. R. 
125. P. 20. Officer Dickey further stated that there is not an emergency every time a family 
fight is reported. R . 125 P. 20. 
Detective Vincent testified for the State of Utah. Detective Vincent stated he was with 
Officer Dickey when they went to Appellants' door. Detective Vincent stated Ms. Comer came 
out of the house onto the porch area. R. 125 P. 22. This is in direct contradiction to statements 
made by Officer Dickey. 
Detective Vincent stated they asked Appellant Misty Comer if there was anyone else 
inside the residence. Ms. Comer stated her husband was inside the house. Both Officer Dickey 
and Detective Vincent followed Ms. Comer inside the residence. R. 125. P. 22. Detective 
Vincent stated there was no signs of a struggle at any time during the questioning of Ms. Comer. 
Detective Vincent stated dispatch did not give any details about the family fight. R. 125. 
P. 25. 
Detective Vincent testified a lot of times reports of a family fight turn out to be a mere 
argument. R. 125 P. 25. 
Detective Vincent testified there was never a life threatening situation in this matter from 
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the time dispatch called to the time the investigation was finished. R. 125 P. 26. 
Detective Vincent testified that at the beginning of this investigation, there was never any 
indication there had been a fight at the residence. R. 125 P. 26 
At the end of the hearing, Appellants' counsel stated there was also an issue about the 
Officers proceeding into the house and back to the back bedroom. R. 125 P 33. 
At the end of the hearing, Counsel for Appellant stated that Appellants wished to show 
the video tape of the preliminary hearing to verify Officer Dickey had made two inconsistent 
statements at the hearing to suppress. The Court declined to hear this evidence and stated that 
was not the critical issue. R. 125 P. 31-32, 
ARGUMENTS 
ISSUE 1: The Trial Court erred in not allowing Appellants5 to use the video tape of the 
preliminary hearing to cross-examine the Officers at the suppression 
hearing. 
Officer Dickey testified he briefly scanned the room when he entered the residence. 
Counsel requested to show the video tape of the preliminary hearing as it evidenced Officer 
Dickey's testimony was inconsistent with earlier testimony. R. 125 P 9, 
At the end of the hearing, Counsel for Appellant stated that Appellants wished to show 
the video tape of the preliminary hearing to verify Officer Dickey had made two inconsistent 
statements at the hearing to suppress. The Court declined to hear this evidence and stated that 
was not the critical issue. R. 125 P. 31-32. 
Although not a major point in the present appeal, Appellants argue the Court did not 
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afford a fair hearing on the motion to suppress by not allowing Appellants to use the video tape 
of the preliminary hearing to cross-examine the witness. Appellants attempted to show the 
Officer Dickey's testimony was inconsistent from his testimony at the preliminary hearing. 
Credibility is always an issue during testimony of witnesses. In essence, the only 
evidence the trial court has is the testimony of witnesses. If there is evidence a witness is 
testifying inconsistently, it may call into question the witnesses* entire testimony. The trial court 
should have allowed Appellants to present evidence to challenge the veracity of the witnesses 
statements. 
Furthermore. Detective Vincent stated Appellant Misty Comer exited the residence and 
stood on the front porch. R. 125 P. 22. Officer Dickey testified Appellant Misty Comer did not 
exit the residence but merely opened the door 12 inched and peeked outside. R. 125 P. 7 
Even the testimony from the two State witnesses was inconsistent. Appellants should 
have been allowed to explore this matter further. 
ISSUE 2: The Officers did not have probable cause to eater Appellants9 
residence. 
Appellant asserts a warrantless search of their residence violated both the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
In CitvofOremv.Henrie, 868 P.2d 1384 (Utah App. 1994) this Court held 
Under the Fourth Amendment, we employ a strong preference in favor of 
warrants, particularly when a person's residence is involved. Indeed," 'physical 
entry of the home is the chief evil against which the ... Fourth Amendment is 
directed.'" > Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748, 104 S.Ct. 2091,2097, 80 
L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) (quoting > United States v. United States District Court, 407 
U.S. 297, 313, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 2134, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972)). As such, "searches 
and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.'1 > 
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Id. 466 U.S. at 749,104 S.Ct. at 2097 (citing > Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 
573, 587,100 S.Ct. 1371,1380, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980)); accord > State v. 
Christensen, 676 P.2d 408,411 (Utah 1984); > State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9,13 
(Utah App. 1993). 
However, the presumption against warrantless searches is not without its 
exceptions which are " 'jealously and carefully drawn.'" > State v. Ashe, 745 
P.2d 1255,1258 (Utah 1987) (quoting > Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 
499, 78 S.Ct. 1253, 1257, 2 L.Ed.2d 1514 (1958)). Where probable cause and 
exigent circumstances are proven, a warrantless search of a home is permissible. 
> Id. 745 P.2d at 1258-59. In the instant case, the City bears the burden of 
showing both probable cause and exigent circumstances, and "because entry into a 
home [is] involved, that burden is particularly heavy." > State v. Ramirez, 814 
P.2d 1131, 1133 (Utah App. 1991). 
868 P.2d 1384, City of Orem v. Henrie, (Utah App. 1994) 
Excerpt from pages 868 P.2d 1387-868 P.2d 1388 
The Trial Court, in essence ruled the requirements for the emergency circumstances 
doctrine have been meet based on the following: 
a. Misty Comer made a somewhat sudden and unexplained retreat into the 
house, in other words without saying why. Under those circumstances it is 
reasonable that the officers followed her into the house. Now, had she stayed out 
on the porch you have an entirely different set of circumstances. 
b. The basis for the emergency was not only the call, but her behavior at 
the time and they followed her. There doesn't appear to be any evidence that 
following her they said, oh, let's follow her in, maybe we can find drugs. . . 
.There does seem to be a reasonable basis that the emergency is associated with 
the area they searched. R. 125 P. 40. 
The Court is incorrect in the conclusion about the emergency circumstance doctrine and 
has stretched that doctrine unreasonably beyond its scope to fit these facts. 
In Salt Lake City v. Davidson. 994 P.2d 1283 (Utahn App 2000) this Court held 
Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, searches 
conducted without warrants " 'are per se unreasonable ... subject only to a few 
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.'" > State v. Ashe, 745 
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P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514,19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)). > (FN4) One such 
exception to the warrant requirement recognized by both the United States 
Supreme Court and Utah's appellate courts is exigent circumstances. See > 
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2413, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 . 
(1978); > State v. Genovesi, 909 P.2d 916, 921 (Utah Ct.App.1995). 
> [6] ^J10 The emergency aid doctrine, sometimes referred to as the 
medical emergency doctrine, is a variant of the exigent circumstances doctrine. 
See Tracy A. Bateman, Annotation, > Lawfulness of Search of Person or Personal 
Effects under Medical Emergency Exception to Warrant Requirement, 11 A.L.R. 
5th 52, § 2[a] (1993). Bateman describes the emergency aid doctrine as follows: 
The medical emergency exception will support a warrantless search of a person or 
personal effects when [a] person is found in an unconscious or semiconscious 
condition and the purpose of the search is to discover evidence of identification 
and other information that might enhance the prospect of administering 
appropriate medical assistance, and the rationale is that the need to protect life or 
avoid serious injury to another is paramount to the rights of privacy.... 
Id. Several courts have also applied the emergency aid doctrine when a person is 
missing and feared to be injured or dead. See, e.g., > People v. Mitchell, 39 
N.Y.2d 173, 383 N.Y.S.2d 246, 347 N.E.2d 607 (1976). Whether an emergency 
exists is fact intensive and the state has the burden "to prove that the exigencies of 
the situation make the course imperative." Annotation, > 11 A.L.R. 5th, § 2[a] at 
60. 
The emergency aid doctrine has not been specifically adopted or applied by a 
majority opinion of either of Utah's appellate courts, but was endorsed in a 
concurring opinion in > State v. Yoder, 935 P.2d 534, 550 (Utah Ct.App.1997) 
(Greenwood, J., concurring in result). However, in > Provo City v. Warden, 844 
P.2d 360, 364 (Utah Ct.App.1992), this court approved the closely related 
community caretaker doctrine under which a seizure does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment if certain criteria are satisfied. > (FN5) In that case, a police stop of 
an automobile was declared lawful because the officer reasonably believed the 
motorist was contemplating suicide. See > id. at 364-66. > (FN6) The 
community caretaker doctrine and the emergency aid doctrine are based on similar 
rationales, as noted by the Kansas Court of Appeals, which, in endorsing the 
emergency aid doctrine, stated that the doctrine "reflects a recognition that the 
police perform a community caretaking function which goes beyond fighting 
crime." > State v. Jones, 24 Kan.App.2d 405, 947 P.2d 1030, 1034 (1997). 
In > Yoder, the concurring opinion advocated adopting a test for application of the 
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emergency aid doctrine similar to that set forth in > Mitchell, 383 N.Y.S.2d 246, 
347 N.E.2d at 609. Pursuant to that test, a warrantless search is lawful under the 
emergency aid doctrine if the following requirements are met: 
(1) Police have an objectively reasonable basis to believe that an emergency exists 
and believe there is an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of 
life. 
(2) The search is not primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence. 
(3) There is some reasonable basis to associate the emergency with the area or 
place to be searched. That is, there must be a connection with the area to be 
searched and the emergency. 
Yoder, 935 P.2d at 550 (Greenwood, J., concurring in result). The > Mitchell 
three-prong test has been followed by "[s]everal states, including Alaska, Arizona, 
Illinois, Nebraska, and North Dakota... and it is often cited with approval by legal 
commentators." > Jones, 947 P.2d at 1037; see also > State v. Cheers, 79 Ohio 
App.3d 322, 607 N.E.2d 115, 117-18 (1992) (approving emergency doctrine but 
stating search illegal because no reasonable basis to believe emergency situation 
existed).. . 
Because this reasonable basis must approximate probable cause and is used to 
justify abrogation of Fourth Amendment rights, emergency aid searches should be 
" 'strictly circumscribed by [circumstances] which justify its initiation.'" > 
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. at 393, 98 S.Ct. at 2413 (quoting > Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1, 25-26, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1882, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). 
994 P.2d 1283, Salt Lake City v. Davidson, (Utah App. 2000) 
— Excerpt from page 994 P.2d 1287 
In the present action, the Trial Court ruled that coupled with the dispatch call of a 
reported family fight and the fact Appellant Misty Comer made a hasty retreat into the residence, 
the requirements of the emergency doctrine circumstances have been met. 
First, the nature of the call should not even be taken into account. The testimony of both 
Officer Dickey and Detective Vincent verified there was no information about what the family 
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fight call entailed. The State's witnesses had no information about any situation other than there 
was a report of a family fight. This certainly cannot be the basis for reasonable suspicion. The 
policy reasons behind this are clear and apparently overlooked by the trial court. Basically, 
anyone could Imake a call about anything. According to the trial court,#the officers then, without 
any other information other than the call itself, would be an automatic basis for reasonable 
suspicion. 
Perhaps, if the facts had been different in this case, such as the dispatch reported indicated 
there were gunshots fired and a person made be injured, there may be a basis for reasonable 
suspicion. However, there is nothing in these facts to indicate there was any emergency at all. 
There was merely a call of a family fight. Both the State's witnesses testified there are times 
when family fight calls are merely arguments. 
Second. Appellant Misty Comer's "hasty retreat" into the residence does not support 
resonable suspicion either. 
In State v. Wells. 928 P.2d 386 (Utah App. 1996) this Court held 
In > State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9 (Utah App.1993), this court concluded "[t]he 
existence of exigent circumstances must be based on the reasonable belief of the 
police officer." > Id. at 18. The mere possibility that a suspect may have a 
weapon, > id. at 19, or that evidence might be destroyed, > Palmer, 803 P.2d at 
1253, is insufficient. See also > United States v. Tarazon. 989 F.2d 1045, 1049 
(9th Cir.1993) (stating police must have "reasonable belief that exigent 
circumstances exist); > United States v. Roark, 36 F.3d 14, 17 (6th Cir.1994) 
(rejecting exigent circumstances claim based solely on "unsubstantiated 
suspicions" of police officer who feared removal of marijuana). 
928 P.2d 386, State v. Wells, (Utah App. 1996) 
Excerpt from page 928 P.2d 389 
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The same is true in the present situation. The mere possibilty there may be an emergency 
is insufficient. In the present action, that is exactly what the trial court held. This is insufficient 
to support reasonable suspicion. 
In State v. Genovesi. 909 P.2d 916 (Utah App. 1995) this Court cited related cases of the 
emergency circumstances doctrine. 
See also > State v. Geisier, 222 Conn. 672? 610 A.2d 1225, 1237 (1992) (even if 
police entry to give emergency aid was lawful, "once they ascertained that 
[occupant] was physically well they should have withdrawn"); > State v. Miller, 
300 Or. 203, 709 P.2d 225, 244 (1985) (while initial warrantless entry based on 
emergency was lawful, "[a]fter the officer entered the room and found the victim 
dead,... the emergency situation ceased"), cert, denied, > 475 U.S. 1141, 106 
S.Ct. 1793, 90 L.Ed.2d 339 (1986); > State v. Beaumier, 480 A.2d 1367,1373-74 
(R.L1984) (police could not remain on premises and investigate without warrant 
after injured party was arrested and removed from premises). Defendant contends 
the home could have been secured so that evidence would not be lost or destroyed 
while the police sought a search warrant from a magistrate. 
909 P.2d 916, State v. Genovesi, (Utah App. 1995) 
. Excerpt from page 909 P.2d 921 
In the present action, the State witnesses verified there was no emergency after they 
entered the residence. The trial court ruled there was a basis for the arrest after the officers 
entered the residence. The trial court does not specifically rule that there permitted the officers to 
search the remainder of the residence; however, it can be inferred from the trial court's 
statements that the trial court attempted to respond to the ruling in State v. Genovesi. (which was 
quoted in Appellant's motion to suppress); 
Basically, when the officers discovered there was no emergency circumstances, they 
should have withdrawn and got a warrant. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the above arguments, the trial court erred in denying Appellants' motion to 
suppress. Emergency circumstances did not exist which would allow a warrantless entry into 
Appellants' residence. 
Respectfully submitted this f 2L day of July, 2001. 
^BOND 
Request for Oral Argument / Attoifney for Appellant 
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